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INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of militant democracy has been attracting an increasing measure of attention amongst 
political and legal scholars due to the rise of populist victories in liberal democracies in recent years. 
Militant democracy can be defined as the ability of liberal democracies to legally defend themselves 
against threats to their existence by eliminating anti-democratic individuals and groups from the political 
arena.1 The term ‘militant democracy’ was first coined by German legal scholar Karl Loewenstein in 
1937 in response to Hitler’s regime and the rise of fascism in Europe.2 Hitler gained power through 
democratic means and then subsequently destroyed the liberal principles of the Weimar democracy 
such as separation of powers and guarantees of fundamental rights. He transformed the Weimar 
Republic from having the most progressive constitution in Europe into a ruthless dictatorship, 
responsible for the worst atrocities of recent history.3  
 
The collapse of the Weimar democracy represented the ultimate example of how democracy can be 
destroyed from within by abusing democratic institutions and this example has played a key role in the 
development of the concept of militant democracy.4 As Paul Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda 
in Nazi Germany, commented “one of the best jokes of democracy [is] that it gave its deadly enemies 
the means by which it was destroyed”.5 Loewenstein argued that democracies can only overcome the 
challenges to its existence by expelling its enemies from the political arena and banning anti-democratic 
parties. He recommended adopting legal instruments to restrict freedom of speech, association and 
participation when necessary to relinquish the neutrality of democracy.6 Aspects of Loewenstein’s 
concept of militant democracy have been embedded in several liberal constitutions and have been used 
to curb activities of fascist, communist, religious fundamentalist, racist  and violent political parties since 
the end of World War II.7 
 
                                                 
1 Svetlana Tyulkina, Militant Democracy: Undemocratic Political Parties and Beyond (Routledge 2015) p.15 
2 Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I’ (1937) 31 The American Political Science 
Review pp.417-432 
3 Miles Roger Maftean, ‘Fighting Fire with Fire: A Normative Exploration of the Militant Democracy Principle’ 
(Central European University, Hungary, 2018) p.13 
4 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.11 
5 Giovanni Capoccia, ‘Militant Democracy: The Institutional Bases of Democratic Self-Preservation’ (2013) 9 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science p.208 
6 Bastiaan Rijpkema, Militant Democracy: The Limits of Democratic Tolerance (Routledge 2018) p.3 
7 Maftean (2018) supra n.3 p.2 
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One could easily be forgiven for confusing the term ‘militant democracy’ as an oxymoron and an affront 
to liberal values. After all, how can liberal democracy - which is an essentially tolerant and 
accommodating system - become militant by imposing restrictions on democracy? The answer lies 
within the very nature of democracy. Democracy is an inherently vulnerable and precarious political 
system. The principles which underpin and characterise democracy might also, through their 
application, endanger it and bring about its destruction.8 Throughout history democracy’s enemies have 
recognised that the easiest way to defeat this system is to exploit its openness to a plurality of views 
and its guarantees on fundamental human rights such as free elections, freedom of speech and freedom 
of association.9 The inherent weakness of democracy has occupied thinkers for millennia. Plato’s 
critique of Athenian democracy led him to declare that “the trajectory that begins with the delights of 
democracy ends with the nightmare of tyranny”10. Plato warned of how democracy can empower the 
masses but, in turn, lead to that power being abused either by the people themselves or by demagogues 
preying on the anxiety of the masses.11  
 
Plato’s commentary on how democracies can give way to tyrannies when mob passion overwhelms 
political wisdom and a populist autocrat seizes the masses, bears remarkable similarities with the traits 
embodied by right-wing populists in today’s world.  Indeed, right-wing populism has emerged as the 
single greatest political threat to liberal democracy and international human rights law (IHRL). The rise 
of right-wing populism was most clearly evidenced in the tactics used during Trump’s presidential 
election campaign, the manner in which the Leave campaign operated during the UK’s 2016 EU 
referendum and in a series of other right-wing populist political victories in recent years.12  The modus 
operandi of right-wing populism is to defeat liberal democracy and undermine human rights through a 
politics of hate, a promotion of fear and scapegoating.13  Indeed, as recently as 2018, Hungary’s Prime 
Minister, Viktor Orbán declared: “The era of liberal democracy is over”.14    
                                                 
8 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.206 
9 Ibid pp.11-14 
10 Ibid p.11 
11 Sean Illing, ‘The people’s tyrant: What Plato can teach us about Donald Trump’ Vox (7 November 2016) 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/7/13512960/donald-trump-plato-democracy-tyranny-fascism-
2016-elections  
12 Andrew Fagan, ‘Constructively Confronting Right-Wing Populism’ University of Essex Human Rights Centre 
Blog (2 October 2019)  https://hrcessex.wordpress.com/2019/10/02/constructively-confronting-right-wing-
populism/  
13 William A, Galston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy’ (2018) 29 Journal of Democracy p.13 
14 Jay Nordlinger, ‘The Era of Liberal Democracy Is Over’ The Corner (13 May 2018) 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-era-of-liberal-democracy-is-over/ 
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Today, populist governments promote division and openly disregard the fundamental principles of 
liberal democracy such as equality and non-discrimination by spreading a racist and xenophobic 
message and alienating minorities and immigrants across Europe and the USA.15 This trend worries 
many scholars for awakening the memories of fascism.16  Furthermore, the weakening state support for 
liberal values and human right principles has been hampering the facilitating conditions that have long 
supported the work of IHRL institutions. Populist governments are now increasingly undermining the 
authority of IHRL institutions and posing a significant threat to the future of international human rights 
law. 17 The threat to liberal democracy and to international human rights law posed by the rise of right-
wing populism cannot be underestimated. Lessons need to be learned from the failures of the past 
when democracy was unable to protect itself from enemies who sought to destroy democracy by 
exploiting its tolerant nature and openness to a plurality of views.  
 
This dissertation seeks to examine how militant democracy can function as a safeguard for liberal 
democracy and international human rights law against the rise of right-wing populism. The study will 
begin with an analysis of the origins and development of the concept of militant democracy and a 
consideration of its legal basis. Attention will then turn to the threats posed to liberal democracy and 
international human rights law by the burgeoning trend of right-wing populism, in particular in Europe 
and the USA. The study will conclude with a discussion of how the use of militant democracy measures 
against right-wing populism can be justified under the notion of ‘substantive democracy’ and 
international human rights law. It will be argued that although there are challenges to the application of 
militant democracy measures, the concept can be a potential tool for combating right-wing populism by 
setting out the constitutional boundaries of democratic tolerance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Enzo Traverso, The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right (Verso 2019) (Kindle edn) ch.1 part 1 
16 Ibid 
17 Laurence Helfer, ‘Populism and International Human Rights Law Institutions: A Survival Guide’ iCourts 
Working Paper Series (No.133, 2018) p.4 
 4 
CHAPTER 1 
Militant Democracy: A Safeguard for Liberal Democracy and Human Rights 
 
1.1. The origin of the concept of militant democracy 
 
1.1.1. The rise of fascism and the collapse of the Weimar Republic 
 
In order to understand how militant democracy grew into becoming a significant constitutional defence 
mechanism, it is important to first explore the events of 1920s and 1930s when fascism was on the rise 
and democracy was under threat in many countries across Europe.18 The fascist movement first 
emerged in Italy during World War I in favour of totalitarian one-party state in stark opposition to 
liberalism and Marxism and quickly grew in popularity. By 1924, the Italian Fascist Party had become 
established and was able to win parliamentary elections. Just months after coming to power, Mussolini 
dismissed the Parliament, abandoned democracy and declared himself the dictator of the country.19 
Similarly, Albania (1923), Portugal (1925), Poland (1926-1935), Yugoslavia (1929) and Romania (1938) 
chose dictatorships over democracy. Europe was losing its confidence in democracy and fascism was 
quickly spreading across the continent and to the other parts of the world.20  
 
The extent of the threat against democracy posed by fascism was, perhaps, most evident in the 
controversies surrounding the short-lived Weimar democracy. The Weimar Republic was formed with 
the adoption of the first liberal constitution of the German nation in August 1919 and was considered to 
be the most progressive democracy in Europe at the time. The constitution was based on the principles 
of liberal democracy which guaranteed political plurality, separation of powers, the rule of law and the 
Bill of Rights guaranteed fundamental rights such as free elections, freedom of speech, freedom of 
association and religion and equality before the law for everyone.21  However, in little over 13 years, the 
Weimar Republic had transformed from having the most progressive constitution in Europe into a 
ruthless dictatorship, responsible for the worst atrocities of its time.22 The collapse of the Weimar 
                                                 
18 Rijpkema (2018) supra n.6 p.21 
19 G. Payne Stanley, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Routledge 2005) p.114 
20 Capoccia (2013) supra n.5 p.208 
21 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.11 
22 Maftean (2018) supra n.3 p.13 
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democracy has become known as the ultimate example of how democracy can be destroyed from within 
by abusing democratic institutions and this example has played a key role in the development of the 
concept of militant democracy.23 
 
The political system in the Weimar Republic was based on proportional representation and popular 
sovereignty and it had extensive tolerance towards political pluralism with little concern for political 
actors whose aims were to turn the system into a totalitarian one-party state. This meant that even anti-
democratic parties could participate freely in politics.24 Indeed, the National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party (the Nazi Party) with a far-right, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic agenda was operating within the 
system and plotting a national revolution soon after the birth of the Republic.25 The leader of the party, 
Adolf Hitler, followed his nationalist and racist agenda with little confrontation until 1923. He attempted 
to launch a coup d’état in November 1923 but failed owing to a lack of support from commanders. He 
was found guilty and imprisoned for treason and his party was banned.26 Out of that failure, Hitler 
decided to change his tactics; instead of continuing as a violent revolutionary, he chose to play along 
with the democratic institutions in order to destroy democracy from within. He planned to utilise the 
constitutional freedoms of speech, association and press to build up a large enough following which 
would make the revolution possible.27 Eventually, he was released from prison in 1925 and he managed 
to convince the authorities to reverse the ban on the Nazi Party.28  
 
Although the Party only gained 2.6% of the votes in 1928 parliamentary elections, they slowly increased 
their popularity amongst the suffering lower middle-class by exploiting the economic crisis and using 
capitalism and Jews as scapegoats. The party finally managed to attract the largest percentage of the 
votes in 1932 and Hitler was appointed as the Chancellor in January 1933. Just two months after taking 
office and following the widespread use of propaganda against the opposition, Hitler convinced the 
Parliament to pass the Enabling Act which suspended the key principles of the Weimar constitution 
such as separation of powers and guarantees of rights and freedoms. Hitler had the power to rule by 
decree and suppressed all political opponents. He finally ended the Weimar democracy and established 
                                                 
23 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.11 
24 Ibid p.12 
25 Rijpkema (2018) supra n.6 p.1 
26 David Jablonsky, The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit, 1923-1925 (Routledge 1989) p.57 
27 Rijpkema (2018) supra n.6 p.1 
28 Adrian Weale, The SS: A New History (Little, Brown 2010) pp.26-29 
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the totalitarian dictatorship for which he had long aspired.29 Perhaps Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of 
Propaganda at the time, best summed up how the Nazi Party had exploited democracy for its own 
agenda: “We enter Parliament in order to supply ourselves, in the arsenal of democracy, with its own 
weapons. If democracy is so stupid as to give us free tickets and salaries for this work, that is its affair… 
We do not come as friends, nor even as neutral.”30 It is obvious that the Nazi Party was never on the 
side of democracy but they successfully acquired power by using democratic means and constitutional 
freedoms, only to subsequently overthrow democracy and deny the same freedoms to others as soon 
as they assumed power.  
 
The events during this period revealed that the traditional understanding of liberal democracy at the 
time was not capable of eliminating internal enemies as it proved too tolerant towards the notion of 
political plurality and lacked constitutional defence mechanisms for those who may seek to undermine 
the system.31 This tolerant nature proved democracy’s own downfall and facilitated anti-democratic 
individuals and groups to exploit democratic institutions such as free elections, freedom of speech and 
freedom of association in the pursuit of overthrowing the regime itself. In order to survive, liberal 
democracy needed to be prepared to overcome these attempts to destroy it from within and put in place 
self-defensive systems that could be initiated when necessary. In other words, liberal democracy had 
to be “militant” against those exploiting the rights and freedoms provided by the system. This ideology 
became known as the concept of ‘militant democracy’.32  
 
1.1.2. Karl Loewenstein: The father of the concept of militant democracy 
 
The term ‘militant democracy’ (webrhafte demokratie) was first introduced into constitutional doctrine 
by the German legal scholar Karl Loewenstein whilst he was studying the challenges that democracies 
faced with the rise of fascism in 1930s. Loewenstein, himself, was a victim of the fascist movement in 
Europe. He was made redundant from his position at the University of Munich upon Hitler’s rise to power 
in 1933. He then fled the Nazis and migrated to the USA and continued his work at Yale University.33 
                                                 
29 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.12 
30 Joseph Goebbels, Der Angriff. Aufsätze aus der Kampfzeit (Essays from the Time of Struggle) (Zentralverlag 
der NSDAP 1935) pp.71-73 
31 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.13 
32 Ibid p.13 
33 Rijpkema (2018) supra n.6 p.25 
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In 1937, after studying several democracies in Europe, Loewenstein published his article on militant 
democracy and fundamental freedoms and called on European democracies to take action to address 
the weaknesses of democracy and to adopt special legal measures to prevent individuals and groups 
from exploiting these weaknesses.34 He criticised the ‘outdated’ view of liberal democracy at the time 
which accorded the use of democratic institutions of speech, press, association and parliamentary 
participation to everyone equally including anti-democrats. He argued that this ‘democratic 
fundamentalism’ and ‘legalistic blindness’ allows democracy’s enemies to enter into its heart and 
prepare its downfall.35 He claimed that democracies can only overcome these challenges by expelling 
its enemies from the political arena and banning anti-democratic parties. He recommended adopting 
legal instruments to restrict freedom of speech, association and participation when necessary to 
relinquish the neutrality of democracy.36  
 
Loewenstein’s work on militant democracy was criticised by some scholars for contradicting the inherent 
character of liberal democracy. French scholar Thierry Maulnier argued that it was not democratic 
fundamentalism itself that facilitated the rise of fascism. He claimed that the political and economic crisis 
that was prominent in Europe at the time formed a breeding ground for fascism and led to the failure of 
democracy.37 German scholar Karl Mannheim also referred to the economic situation at the time and 
recommended social change as the answer to the problem. He emphasised the importance of 
addressing the conditions that turned voters to extremist parties and argued that effective economic 
planning should be the key component of militant democracy rather than restricting democratic 
freedoms.38 Loewenstein, on the other hand, believed that although the economic and political crisis 
accelerated the rise of fascism, it was the tolerant and accommodating nature of liberal democracy that 
made it vulnerable to fascism and extremist movements.39 He argued that fascism was not an ideology 
but a ‘sophisticated technique’ which succeeded with its perfect adaptation to democracy and appeal 
to the psychology of the masses. Fascism was able to exploit the tolerant nature of democracy and 
utilised emotional manipulation to increase its support base amongst the population.40 Loewenstein saw 
                                                 
34 Loewenstein (1937) supra n.2 pp.417-432 
35 Ibid p.424 
36 Rijpkema (2018) supra n.6 p.3 
37 Ibid p.26 
38 Capoccia (2013) supra n.5 p.208 
39 Rijpkema (2018) supra n.6 p.26 
40 Loewenstein (1937) supra n.2 p.423 
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this ‘emotionalism’ as the biggest enemy of democracy and argued that it can deter a rational approach 
to any problem in any democracy and can pose a threat to the rule of law.41 As a result, democracy had 
to become militant and ‘fight fire with fire’ by providing constitutional defence mechanisms.42  
 
Loewenstein also acknowledged the paradox surrounding militant democracy owing to its restricting 
nature on freedom of speech, press, association and parliamentary participation. It was a difficult task 
for democracy to restrict these freedoms “without destroying the very basis of its existence”; after all, 
democracy inherently stood for equal enjoyment of these freedoms by everyone. However, 
Loewenstein believed that this paradox faded when compared to the nature of the threat as there was 
a war against democracy and special measures were necessary to fight it.43 This justification did not 
satisfy all of his critics as the limits of the concept were not adequately defined leaving it open to abuse 
in the name of democratic self-defence. The question of whether a democracy can legally act in an anti-
democratic manner in order to combat threats to its existence still continues to be debated today.44  
 
Although, Loewenstein’s work fell short on the limits and justification of militant democracy, his 
contribution has been widely praised for identifying the weaknesses of democracy and encouraging the 
constitutionalisation of militant democracy principles. Due to his extensive work on the subject, he has 
become known as the father of militant democracy.45 Aspects of his concept of militant democracy have 
now been embedded in many liberal constitutions around the world since the end of World War II 
following the lessons learnt from the fascist era.46 The development and the scope of these provisions 
in comparative constitutional law will be explored further in the next section.  
 
1.2. The development of the concept of militant democracy in comparative law 
 
Unfortunately, Loewenstein’s pleas to adopt militant democracy measures in order to stop fascists in 
Europe did not have any constitutional expression until the end of World War II when fascists had 
already overtaken several democracies and committed some of the worst crimes in history. Following 
                                                 
41 Loewenstein (1937) supra n.2 p.423 
42 Capoccia (2013) supra n.5 p.208 
43 Rijpkema (2018) supra n.6 p.28 
44 Ibid pp.29-30 
45 Ibid p.30 
46 Maftean (2018) supra n.3 p.23 
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the lessons learnt from this era, Europe started to pay attention to the constitutionalisation of the 
concept of militant democracy as a belated response to Loewenstein’s calls. Germany was the first 
country to debate the concept extensively in order to ensure that the events of the Nazi era would never 
happen again.47 In light of these concerns, drafters of the post-war German constitution included militant 
democracy as one of the foundational principles of the German Basic Law in 1949 and gave life to 
various elements of Loewenstein’s concept of militant democracy.48  
 
A central element of German militant democracy is outlined under Article 21 of the Basic Law which 
provides the procedure to ban a political party. The Article states that “parties, that, by reason of their 
aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order 
or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal 
Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality”49. This provision ensures that 
freedom granted to political parties will not be used to disrupt or destroy democratic government. 
Furthermore, Article 79.3 of the Basic Law prohibits alteration of some constitutional provisions, even 
by unanimity, in order to protect democratic principles which were disregarded during the Nazi era. 
Another important element of German militant democracy is the prohibition on abuse of rights. Article 
18 of the Basic Law provides that “whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom 
of press, the freedom of teaching, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of association, the privacy of 
correspondence, posts and telecommunications, the rights of property or the right to asylum in order to 
combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights”. This article further authorises 
the Federal Constitutional Court to determine the extent of this forfeiture. Moreover, German militant 
democracy also allows restricting certain rights as provided by Article 19 of the Basic Law as long as 
the restriction is prescribed by the law and do not affect the essence of the right. Article 33.5 regulates 
the activities of public servants and gives them a duty of loyalty. Finally, Article 20.4 gives German 
people the right to resist anyone who seek to destroy the constitutional order.50 
 
                                                 
47 Patrick Macklem, ‘Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-Determination’ (2006) 4 
International Journal of Constitutional Law p.491 
48 Tyulkina (n1) p.43 
49 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (23 May 1949) 
50 Ibid 
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It is clear that many lessons drawn from the Weimar experience were reflected in the Basic Law of 
1949. The militant democracy provisions reveal the intentions of lawmakers to ensure that the 
shortcomings in the Weimar constitution are not repeated again and that democracy is safeguarded 
against internal threats.51 These provisions also represent a constitutional expression of Loewenstein’s 
argument that democracy should “fight fire with fire” and prevent its enemies from destroying it from 
within.52 Whilst the German Basic Law provided the first elaborate form of militant democracy, a much 
narrower interpretation of the concept was first present in the Italian constitution of 1947. In contrast to 
the German constitution, the Italian constitution targets explicitly fascism rather than an abstract enemy 
and prohibits the reorganisation of the fascist party and authorises restrictions to the political rights of 
fascists.53 Although the German constitution does not explicitly refer to fascism or fascist parties, the 
description of political threat under Art 21 of the Basic Law was clearly drafted due to the concerns 
about the reorganisation of Nazis at the time.54 In fact, in 1952, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany exercised its authority under Article 21 to ban the Socialist Reich Party for having former 
Nazis in leadership positions and advocating anti-democratic, racist and neo-Nazi propaganda.55 
Hence, it can be argued that the initial concerns during the post-war period were mainly regarding the 
re-emergence of fascism and militant democracy was used as a preventative technique to stop this 
scenario.56  
 
Shortly after, however, militant democracy became a tool to curb the activities of a new political enemy: 
communism. During the Cold War, the USA waged a notorious campaign against communism and 
restricted the rights and activities of communist political parties.57 Prior to its war on communism, the 
USA already had restrictions in place on radical speech in order to protect national security with the 
introduction of the Smith Act in 1940. The Act criminalised any actions advocating the overthrow of the 
US government. This Act was later used to prosecute several people for advocating fascist and 
communist ideologies.58 In the case of Dennis v. USA, eleven high ranking members of the Communist 
                                                 
51 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.44 
52 Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II’ (1937) 31 The American Political Science 
Review p.656 
53 Rory O’Connell, ‘Militant Democracy and Human Rights Principles’ (2009) Constitutional Law Review p.3 
54 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.15 
55 Angela Bourne, ‘Party bans as an instrument of militant democracy: Under what conditions do democracies 
ban parties in practice’ (ECPR Joint Sessions, 10-14 April 2018) p.5 
56 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.15 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid p.74 
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Party who were convicted under the Smith Act questioned the constitutionality of the Act before the US 
Supreme Court as they argued it restricted their constitutional freedoms. The Court upheld the 
convictions and ruled that it was constitutional to restrict the freedom of speech guaranteed under the 
First Amendment of the US Constitution when a speech, publication and assembly poses a vital threat 
to national security.59 With this judgment, political right restrictions covered under the concept of militant 
democracy gained constitutional basis in the USA.60 Although, the Communist Party in the USA had a 
minor role in politics, the US government brought about extensive limitations on free speech to prevent 
the spread of communist ideology which was seen as a threat to the democratic order.61 
 
Similarly, in 1956, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled the Communist Party of Germany 
unconstitutional after exercising its power under Article 21 of the Basic Law. Several European countries 
also followed this example and outlawed communist parties.62 With the collapse of the communist 
regime on the European continent, post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe 
followed the German example and included militant democracy provisions in their constitutions. Most 
of these provisions are in relation to restrictions on political rights and banning of political parties in 
order to protect the new constitutional order.63 For instance, Article 13 of the Polish constitution outlaws 
political parties based on totalitarianism and racial or national hatred, Article 37 of the Ukrainian 
constitution authorises banning of political parties that pose a threat to independence of the state and 
Article 11 of the Bulgarian constitution prohibits formation of political parties on the basis of ethnicity.64  
 
In addition, militant democracy was used to neutralise religiously affiliated political parties in Turkey in 
order to protect the constitutional principle of secularism. Similar to the German Constitution, the 
Constitution of Turkey prohibits alteration of certain constitutional provisions even by unanimity. These 
provisions are related to the main characteristics of the Turkish Republic which provides, amongst 
others, that Turkey is a democratic and secular Republic governed by the rule of law.65 The Constitution 
emphasises the secular nature of Turkish democracy in order to distance the Republic from the previous 
                                                 
59 Dennis v US, 341 U.S. 494 (4 June 1951) 
60 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.74 
61 Ibid p.74 
62 Ibid p.15 
63 Ibid p.44 
64 Macklem (2006) supra n.47 p.493 
65 Bertil Emrah Oder, ‘Roots of Militant Democracy in Turkey: Modernity, Authoritarianism and Europeanization” 
in Markus Thiel (ed), The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern Democracies (Routledge 2016) pp.264-279 
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rule of the Ottoman Empire as the Empire was ruled by the Islamic religious law.66 The Constitution 
further authorises limitations to freedom of speech and opinion in order to protect national security, 
public order and public safety and the basic characteristics of the Republic.67 More importantly, the 
Constitution specifically prohibits the abuse of freedom of religion by emphasising that “No one shall be 
allowed to exploit or abuse religion, religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner 
whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the 
fundamental, social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religious tenets”.68 The specific 
provision on abuse of freedom of religion was drafted in order to stop social or political groups which 
may try to exploit religious sentiments amongst people as some groups in society were not happy with 
the secular nature of the Republic and desired the return of the Islamic rule of the Ottoman Empire.69  
 
Indeed, the short history of the Turkish Republic has seen many attempts by political parties to utilise 
religious propaganda and appeal to the ambitions of certain sections of society to bring back religious 
rule.70 The Constitutional Court of Turkey dissolved several political parties for having an Islamic agenda 
and threatening the principle of secularism. The most high-profile case was the decision of the 
Constitutional Court to ban Refah Partisi in January 1998 as the Court found that the party aimed to 
introduce Islamic law and promote the concept of jihad (a holy war to ensure the complete domination 
of Islam in society) in Turkey.71 This decision was later supported by the ECtHR in the case of Refah 
Partisi v. Turkey.72 The decision of ECtHR to rule that the party was a threat to democracy and its 
dissolution was lawful presented a significant moment in the development of the concept of militant 
democracy as it gave the concept a legal basis on an international level.73 The role of the ECtHR in the 
justification of militant democracy will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
Furthermore, 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 saw the emergence of a new trend in the militant 
democracy debate. With anti-terrorism policies and legislation that followed after these terror attacks, 
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the scope of militant democracy went further from only applying to political parties. The concept has 
grown to be seen as a tool to protect democracy from other emerging threats such as religious 
fundamentalists and terrorists in addition to undemocratic political parties.74 The USA and several other 
European countries introduced anti-terrorism policies and legislation in order to curb the activities of 
religious fundamentalists and terrorist groups that pose a threat to democracy. These policies and 
legislation authorised limitations on rights to freedom of speech, association and religion with the 
justification that these rights can be denied to those who abuse constitutional freedoms to destroy 
democratic order.75 For instance, the UK Parliament passed a series of Terrorism Acts between 2000 
and 2015 and adopted the Counter-Extremism Strategy in October 2015 to counter all sorts of 
extremism. The Country proscribed Islamist Al-Muhajiroun network in 2005, the Shariah Project in 2014 
and the far-right, neo-Nazi organisation National Action in 2016 under these anti-terrorism legislations.76 
However, the lack of concrete international concept for terrorism meant that these measures were open 
to interpretation and states have been criticised for misusing them and violating fundamental human 
rights.77  
 
Most states now have militant democracy provisions in place with the justification of protecting 
democracy and human rights against political violence, hate speech, far-right and racist movements 
and terrorism.78 These measures vary from state to state but mostly include banning of political parties, 
criminalising political organisations, hate speech legislations, anti-terrorism legislations and restrictions 
on certain human rights such as freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and the right to vote and take part in the 
government.79 Some States have explicit references to party bans and right limitations in their 
constitutions as mentioned earlier. Other constitutions are not so obvious in this regard, but the militant 
nature of democracy can be inferred from Court judgments and judges’ interpretations of constitutional 
freedoms as it was seen in the case of Dennis v. USA.80  In the UK, there is not a doctrine of militant 
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democracy, partly because the country lacks a written constitution. However, militant democracy 
measures were used by UK governments in the form of specific laws passed by the Parliament.81 For 
instance, the UK government banned Sinn Fein, an Irish nationalist political party, in 1956 and Irish 
Republican Clubs in 1967 for supporting the terrorist group IRA and threatening the preservation of 
peace and order.82 Both Sinn Fein and Republican Clubs were legalised again in 1970s in the pursuit 
of resolving the conflict between Ireland and Northern Ireland.83  
 
Today, Western states are becoming increasingly reluctant to ban political parties in stark contrast to 
the immediate post-war period. Contemporary party bans are mostly directed against violent forms of 
political extremism and non-violent forms of right-wing extremism continues to operate in many 
countries.84 In 2010, the right-wing extremist Workers’ Party (DS) in Czech Republic was banned by 
the Country’s Supreme Court for organising hatred riots and violent attacks on Czech minorities by its 
neo-Nazi paramilitary units. However, after its dissolution, the party was reorganised under the name 
of Workers’ Party of Social Justice without the violent elements and continues to operate today with the 
same neo-Nazi political agenda.85 There are similar political parties mobilising support in all parts of 
Europe. The Austrian Freedom Party, for instance, was originally founded by a former Nazi officer Anton 
Reinthaller in 1956. The party changed its strategy to right-wing populism following Jörg Haider’s 
leadership in 1986.86 Similarly, Sweden Democrats has its roots in fascism. The party’s first chairman 
Anders Klarströrm was an active neo-Nazi and members often wore Nazi uniforms to party meetings. 
Only in the 1990s, Sweden Democrats officially distanced themselves from their Nazi past.87 National 
Front in France also emerged from French Fascism. The party’s founder Jean-Marie Le Pen was 
convicted of hate speech several times for denying the Holocaust, sympathising with French Nazi leader 
Phillippe Pétain and spreading Islamophobia.88 He was expelled from the Party in 2015 as his daughter 
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Marine Le Pen has been trying to distance the Party from its anti-Semitic past. Marine Le Pen continues 
her nationalist and anti-immigration propaganda with a softer tone than her father in order to appeal to 
people.89  
 
In 2017, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled against banning the neo-Nazi National 
Democratic Party (NDP) even though it found evidence that the Party was racist, anti-Semitic, 
Islamophobic and xenophobic. The Court also accepted that the Party sought to replace parliamentary 
democracy with a Nazi-style authoritarian system, but justified its decision by arguing that the NDP did 
not pose a strong enough threat to liberal democratic order.90 However, the lessons learnt from the Nazi 
regime must not be forgotten. Hitler first started as a violent revolutionary but changed his tactics after 
being imprisoned for treason. Out of that failure, he decided to play along with the democratic institutions 
in order to destroy democracy from within. He planned to utilise the constitutional freedoms of speech, 
association and the press to build up a large enough following which would make the revolution 
possible.91 The Nazi Party of Germany only had about 2.6% of the voters’ support in their first election 
in 1928 and no-one would have predicted the extent of the power they were going to acquire in the 
future92. Hence, the same risk today exists for all extremist or populist parties who do not yet have large 
enough support to change political system. Even though fascism was dismantled and fell out of fashion 
and the number of democracies has more than doubled since the end of World War II, the threat for 
democracy and human rights still lives on.93 The developments since the end of World War II reveal 
that the enemies of democracy have been coming to the forefront in different forms throughout history 
which affected the development of the concept of militant democracy. Today, the threat once again 
comes in a different form, in the shape of populists and spreads a nationalist and racist agenda around 
the world.94 The challenge of this generation is to extend the concept of militant democracy to populist 
parties in order to overcome the threats populism poses to the basic principles of democracy and 
fundamental rights.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Populism: A New Threat for Democracy and Human Rights 
 
2.1. What is populism? 
 
The biggest threat challenging today’s democracies is, perhaps, a new phenomenon called ‘populism’.95 
At first glance, populism does not appear to reject any principles of democracy. Populists often use 
democratic language, insist on elections and referenda and rely on the support of the popular vote. 
However, in order to gain that support and power, they argue that today’s political system – the 
‘establishment’ - is corrupt or elitist and the ordinary people - ‘the real people’ - are forgotten. They 
promise to take down the ‘establishment’ and make democracy work better for ‘the real people’.96 
Populism does not seem to favour any particular political ideas. Both right wing politicians such as 
Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen and left wing politicians such as Bernie Sanders and Alexis Tsipras 
are often considered populists.97 As a result, there is not one single agreed definition or a clear criteria 
for populism.98 However, there is one aspect that unites all populist leaders around the world: they all 
employ an ‘anti-establishment’ narrative and thrive on the support of a frustrated, disenfranchised 
population. Thus, populism is commonly associated with ‘anti-establishment’ sentiments.99  
 
German scholar Jan-Werner Müller argues that populism is actually a form of identity politics.100 
Although politics always include identity in one form or another, populism focuses more on the conflict 
between identities and facilitates a division in society.101 It does this by creating three core concepts: 
‘the people’, ‘the elite’ and ‘the general will’.102 Populists imply that they alone speak on behalf of the 
real people. By real people they mean one homogeneous authentic group of people who are native or 
from a certain socioeconomic status who share similar values.103 They claim that this group of people 
are betrayed and forgotten by the political elite and their interests are not taken into account by the 
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establishment. Any politician, scholar, economist, journalist or artist opposing to this claim are 
considered elitist and the enemies of the people.104 Populists argue that the political elite is incapable 
of serving the general will of the people. They assume that they know this general will and promise to 
fight for real people’s interests against the corrupt establishment.105  
 
There is a certain consensus amongst scholars that populism is actually a political strategy rather than 
an ideology. Venezuelan scholar Moises Naim certainly thinks so as he argues that populism is a 
sophisticated technique that is used by some politicians in order to appeal to a frustrated population in 
order to gain influence and power.106 Australian scholar Benjamin Moffitt also shares this view and 
claims that populists do not care much about the message itself but focus more on the way the message 
is delivered.107 They are known for their dramatic performance and spectacle in order to convince 
people that they alone represent ordinary people and all opponents are elitists and ‘enemies of the 
people’.108 These arguments are startlingly similar to Loewenstein’s analysis of fascism in which he 
claimed that fascism is not an ideology but a clever strategy which works well by utilising emotional 
manipulation and exploiting the tolerant nature of democracy.109  
 
Hungarian legal scholar and former European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judge András Sajó refers 
to this technique used by both fascists and populists as ‘emotionalism’. In his view, emotionalism can 
be characterised by the politics of emotional manipulation which thrives on exploiting people’s emotions 
in order to change the course of the rational democratic decision-making process.110 Populists try to 
mobilise support by raising concerns that are not generally addressed by the political elite. These 
concerns tend to be related to sensitive issues such as national sentiments, economy, class division, 
religion and immigration.111 Left-wing populists tend to rely on economic inequalities and the division 
between different classes within society. Right-wing populists, on the other hand, exploit national 
sentiments amongst people and seek division between natives and foreigners.112 Both left-wing and 
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right-wing populism have been a cause for concern as they have been seen to promote division in 
society. However, right-wing populism has been a particularly disturbing trend for spreading a nationalist 
and xenophobic message and normalising racism across Europe and the USA.113 This trend worries 
many scholars for posing a threat to democracy and human rights.114 Hence, the next section will 
explore this alarming trend further.  
 
2.2 The rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the USA 
 
Right-wing populism has been reshaping the political landscape of Western democracies during the 
last two decades.115 Voters in Europe and the USA have been turning to populist leaders in growing 
numbers. Many people express frustration with long standing institutions and feel that they have been 
alienated by the establishment.116 IPSOS carried out a survey to study populist and nativist sentiments 
amongst people across 27 countries in 2019. The survey revealed that 54% of the participants agree 
that the political system is broken in their respective countries, 66% felt traditional politicians ignore 
‘ordinary’ people and 64% said they want a strong leader to take the country back from the elite.117 In 
addition, the survey revealed widespread support for nativist sentiments and national populism as 60% 
of the participants said that employers should favour natives over immigrants and their nation would be 
better off without accepting all immigrants.118 
 
There are several reasons as to why this phenomenon has been particularly predominant in the West. 
Eatwell and Goodwin argue that the West has been experiencing four important trends in recent years 
which have led to a shift towards right-wing populism. They refer to these trends as the ‘Four Ds’ and 
identify them as distrust of politicians owing to the elitist nature of liberal democracy, destruction of 
national identity caused by immigration and multiculturalism, deprivation which has arisen out of 
growing economic inequalities and the financial crisis, and de-alignment from the mainstream parties 
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due to deep dissatisfaction and weakening bonds.119 Today, increasing numbers of people feel that the 
past was better than the present and worry about their future due to these factors.120 
 
Indeed, British sociologist Tony Giddens argues that globalisation has been changing cities and towns 
across the world, shaking our way of life and undermining people’s settled notion of identity. People 
have been losing jobs due to cheap imported goods from countries like China or working for less as a 
result of cheaper labour coming from elsewhere.121 Rising immigration has been seen as a threat to the 
existing way of living by some natives. Furthermore, the 2015 refugee influx into Europe has fuelled a 
fear of immigration further amongst some Western people due to the perception of cultural differences 
between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, horrifying incidents of terrorism that have been targeting 
Western countries since 9/11 created apprehension and fear towards immigrants from majority Muslim 
countries.122 In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that followed it, have 
fuelled inequalities and anti-establishment sentiments amongst people.123  
 
These developments have been seized upon by populists and used as an opportunity to manipulate 
people’s fear and frustration in order to rise up to power. They blamed the establishment for the current 
situation, played on the nationalist sentiments of people, conspired against immigrants and promoted 
an ‘us and them’ narrative in order to create conflict and gain support.124 The Brexit result in the UK in 
2016 and the election of Donald Trump as the US President in 2017 brought a new sense of urgency 
to study the rising trend of populism which challenges the established political order in the Western 
world.125 The next section will explore populist developments in Europe, the UK and the USA further in 
order to present the extent of this rising trend.  
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2.2.1. Europe 
 
A study carried out by the Guardian newspaper in 2018 highlighted that support for populism in Europe 
has been steadily on the rise and has almost tripled since 1998. The vote share for populists in the 
national elections amongst 31 European countries was only 7% in 1998 but this has now increased to 
25% with almost one in four people supporting a populist party.126 Europe was confronted with this 
reality once again during the recent European elections in 2019 as right-wing populists took almost 25% 
of the seats in the European Parliament.127 A 2011 Chatham House report considers the burgeoning 
support for populist parties as “the most striking development in modern European politics.”128 
 
Right-wing populism emerged in European politics in the late 1990s in response to European integration 
and rising immigration.129 Radical right-wing politicians started this trend by spreading nationalist and 
anti-immigration propaganda in order to appeal to the hidden ambitions of people and draw in voters. 
The Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 fuelled anti-immigration sentiments and accelerated the rise of right-
wing populism in Europe.130 By 2018, populists with far-right and xenophobic sentiments had gained 
enough support to form governments in several countries across Europe including Austria, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia.131 Hungary and Italy have seen the 
largest support for right-wing populism. The radical right-wing politician Victor Orbán, who has been the 
prime minister of Hungary since 2010, repeatedly claimed that Europe is under invasion by migrants 
and projected himself as the saviour of Christian values against Muslim migration to Hungary.132 This 
fear of immigration resonated with many people in rural areas. Over 49% of the voters supported him 
in the 2018 national elections giving him a sufficient majority to change the constitution.133 In Italy, the 
Eurosceptic and anti-establishment Five Star Party and right-wing League have won a combined 
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majority of over 50% in the 2018 national elections and together formed the country’s first populist 
government.134 In Austria, the Freedom Party won over 26% of the vote share in the 2015 national 
elections with an anti-immigration and anti-Islam platform and became part of the coalition government 
taking control of six ministerial positions including foreign affairs and defence.135 Similarly, the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) which has been in government since 1999 increased their popularity up to a 
record 29.5% in the 2015 elections following their promise to reduce the number of immigrants and 
asylum seekers in Switzerland.136  
 
Right-wing populism has been shrinking mainstream parties and changing the political landscape 
across all parts of Europe.137 The French populist Marine Le Pen of the National Front has been 
increasing her support base by campaigning against immigration and globalisation which she holds 
responsible for endangering French civilisation.138 She has been receiving enough support to go 
through to the second round of the presidential elections since 2002 and has been influential in setting 
the political agenda in France as the leading opposition to Emmanuel Macron.139  In the Netherlands, 
Geert Wilders’ populist Freedom Party (PVV) has become the second-largest party in the Parliament 
after the 2017 national elections. Earlier this year, another populist party Forum for Democracy (FvD) 
won the most votes in the Dutch provincial elections just three years after it was founded.140 In Germany, 
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a populist party with far-right and anti-immigration propaganda 
entered the Parliament for the first time after winning 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 Federal elections.141  
 
Even the Scandinavian countries which are often considered as the most progressive in Europe have 
been experiencing the rise of right-wing populism. In Sweden, the far-right party Sweden Democrats 
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which has a neo-Nazi origin managed to increase their vote share from 0.4% to 17.6% in the last twenty 
years. Similarly, in Denmark, the far-right Danish People’s Party has been gaining support with a 
campaign to reduce non-Western immigration and prevent the Islamisation of the country. Finally, 
Norway’s Progress Party and Finland’s Blue Reform Party both with anti-immigration tendencies have 
been part of coalition governments for years. 142  
 
All of these populist parties across Europe are certainly different from one another in many aspects as 
each country has its own peculiarities. However, they are all united in one aspect: they all exploit 
national sentiments, stereotype immigrants and refugees and create a division in society in order to 
take down the mainstream parties and change the traditional politics in a fundamental way. They have 
successfully achieved this goal in several countries by forming majority governments or forcing 
mainstream parties to enter into coalitions with them. They now have the power to influence government 
policies in their countries and challenge European politics in a way that has not been witnessed 
before.143  
 
2.2.2. The United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, right-wing populism reached its peak with the surprising win for the Leave campaign during 
the 2016 Brexit referendum.144 Prior to the referendum, there was an overwhelming call from those in 
power to back the Remain campaign amid warnings Brexit would be a disaster for the country. The 
Prime Minister David Cameron, his Conservative government and the major opposition parties Labour 
and Liberal Democrats all backed the motion to remain in the EU. The Treasury issued warnings that 
leaving the EU would lead to recession, job losses, price hikes, cuts to public services and higher taxes. 
Financial institutions threatened to move their headquarters elsewhere in Europe in the event of Brexit. 
British universities claimed that they would lose European researchers and fall down in the world tables 
as a result of Brexit. The Remain campaign had such an impressive line-up, even the Leave 
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campaigners were doubtful about winning against them.145 However, to everyone’s surprise, UK voters 
defied these warnings and the majority decided to back the Leave campaign.146  
 
Boris Johnson, a Conservative MP at the time and UKIP leader Nigel Farage were the two leading 
campaigners for Brexit. These two politicians deployed a populist strategy in order to manipulate the 
nationalist sentiments of people. They knew that sovereignty and immigration were high up amongst 
the issues that mattered to the working class population, so they focused their propaganda on these 
sensitive issues and exploited the fear and frustration amongst people. They claimed that UK laws were 
being made by the EU institutions in Brussels and Strasbourg and leaving the EU would mean giving 
sovereignty back to British people.147 Furthermore, they projected European migration as a significant 
burden on the country’s economy and the National Health Service (NHS). After the EU opened up 
immigration from Eastern European countries, the UK has seen a surge of European migrants taking 
up low skilled jobs in the country. Although, the wealthier population has benefited from cheaper labour, 
the working class felt threatened by the rising immigration.148  
 
In order to fuel this fear of immigration further, Johnson and Farage went as far as spreading false or 
misleading information. Farage claimed that the UK immigration was at breaking point and produced 
posters with pictures of North African migrants and Syrian refugees trying to enter into the country. 
Although the issue was not directly related to EU migration, it was projected as a consequence of EU 
membership in order to promote anti-European sentiments amongst people.149 Similarly, Boris Johnson 
claimed that Turkey was about to join the EU and 76 million people could soon end up in the UK and 
urged people to vote Leave in order to prevent mass migration from Turkey. This was proven to be a 
false claim as Turkey has long stalled its negotiations with the EU with no prospect of joining the Union 
anytime soon due to rising human rights abuses in the country. Nevertheless, Boris Johnson used it as 
a sales pitch in order to ignite the fear of immigration amongst people.150 He also falsely claimed that 
the UK was paying £350m per week to the EU and leaving the EU would mean this money could be 
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spent on the struggling NHS, a much beloved institution amongst the British public. This promise 
appealed to all sections of British society.151 The fact that some of these claims were misleading or false 
did not stop people who feel disconnected from the establishment from backing the Leave campaign 
and in the end, against all odds, this populist strategy worked and the Leave campaign claimed 
victory.152 
 
Furthermore, the appointment of Boris Johnson as the UK Prime Minister in July 2019 following Theresa 
May’s resignation represents another milestone for populism in the UK as it brought right-wing populism 
into No.10 for the first time.153 Johnson has been eying up the leadership position in the Conservative 
Party since he rebelled against the party leader David Cameron during the Brexit referendum campaign. 
The failure of Theresa May to deliver Brexit and the frustration of the British public with the long Brexit 
process presented Johnson with the perfect opportunity to take on the job. As soon as he took office, 
he resorted to a populist strategy which has proved to be working successfully elsewhere in Europe 
and the USA. He dismissed the pro-European language used by his predecessor and employed a 
nationalist language instead. He argued that turning back from the Brexit decision would be a betrayal 
of the people’s will and promised to deliver Brexit with no more delays and claimed that he will restore 
people’s trust with the Conservative party.154  
 
Although he has only been in office for a relatively short time, Boris Johnson has been the subject of 
several political controversies and has already been accused of silencing the Parliament and 
endangering the future of democracy. Johnson reacted to these claims with defiance and bravado and 
claimed that he is simply trying to deliver the will of British people and accused those who are trying to 
stop Brexit of being traitors and the real enemies of the people and democracy.155 The use of such 
rhetoric is the modus operandi of populists as they tend to claim they alone represent the people and 
all opponents are enemies of the people.156 Johnson’s populist language is yet to pass an election test; 
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however, a recent survey carried out by Prospect magazine revealed that large majority of respondents 
would support a PM who would put Britain first even if it damages relationships with allies or 
disadvantages minorities.157 Putting Britain first seems to be Johnson’s strategy for now. The next 
general election will prove whether this populist strategy will win people over or not but, in the meantime, 
Johnson has the power to lead the country with a nationalist agenda during the Brexit process. 
 
2.2.3 The United States of America 
 
Populism is certainly not just a European phenomenon. In the USA, it has taken centre stage in the 
shape of Donald Trump and has shaken the US political system to its core.158 Similar to the Brexit 
decision in the UK, Trump’s presidency was highly unexpected in the USA.159 Throughout his campaign, 
Trump was accused of being a racist, sexist and even a fascist.160 However, he dismissed all of these 
claims and presented himself as the ‘man of the people’. He often played on the contrast between 
ordinary Americans and the political elite in Washington and promised to ‘Make America great again’ 
by taking down the corrupt establishment.161 He openly used xenophobia and racism as propaganda 
tools by promising to kick out Muslims and Mexicans in order to appeal to the chauvinism of some of 
his electorate. He accused globalism of being un-American, the liberal press of spreading fake news 
and climate change as being a hoax.162  
 
Trump’s populist language was appealing for the lower middle class Americans for various reasons. 
Firstly, they were hit the hardest by 2008 economic crisis which worsened social inequalities in the 
country and left people disillusioned with the political elite.163 Secondly, the advancement of human 
rights was projected by some as non-whites, immigrants and women receiving more economic 
opportunities at the expense of white middle class men.164 In addition, immigrants were projected as 
criminals, drug dealers and a threat to the white community by white nationalist leaders which 
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exacerbated anti-immigration sentiments amongst people.165 Trump manipulated these sentiments with 
his ‘man of the people’ attitude and unusual ‘politically incorrect’ language. His populist strategy claimed 
victory against all the odds making Trump one of the most powerful men in world politics.166 Since 
coming to power, Trump has signed several executive orders in order to fulfil his election promises 
including building a wall along the Mexico-USA border and blocking immigration from some Muslim-
majority countries. These orders have proved to be controversial and divided the nation.167 However, 
Trump continues to thrive on conflict and arms himself with xenophobic, divisive and racist language, 
encouraging polarisation amongst people.168 Although, there is a widespread outcry against Trump’s 
language and his populist policies, his latest approval ratings stand at 48%, highlighting the possibility 
of him being re-elected in the 2020 mid-term elections.169 The result of this election will certainly 
determine the extent to which populism will continue to exert an influence in the US and world politics.  
 
2.3. The populist threat to liberal democracy  
 
As previously mentioned, populists rely on three core concepts in order to gain power and influence: 
‘the real people’, ‘the elite’ and ‘the general will’.170 These core concepts all appear to be problematic 
and challenge the essence of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy requires equality of all citizens, 
inclusive citizenship, political competition, plurality of ideas, ‘separation of powers’ and ‘checks and 
balances’.171 The idea that only one homogenous, authentic group of people represent ‘the real people’ 
undermines the intrinsic nature of liberal democracy as it excludes sections of society from being part 
of ‘the real people’ simply because of their race, nationality, religion, socio-economic status and political 
affiliation.172 This language creates an ‘us and them’ mentality and encourages polarisation within 
society. In addition, projecting all political opposition as elitist and enemies of the people disregards the 
respect for different political ideas required in a democratic society. This language can lead to one party 
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rule by demonising and criminalising political opponents.173 Furthermore, the idea of ‘general will’ 
proposes that there is only one absolute will amongst the population. This is another worrying aspect 
of populism as peoples’ views often differ on any given subject.174 Hence, all three concepts of populism 
pose a great danger to the very existence of democracy since they encourage anti-pluralism, 
polarisation and conflict within the population. Democracy has to be open to a plurality of political ideas 
and a society where everyone can live together as free and equal no matter how diverse they may 
be.175   
 
Although, populists pretend to talk the language of democratic values, once they assume power, they 
appear to become increasingly authoritarian towards opposition and minorities.176 Populists claim that 
liberal values of democracy harm ‘the real people’ as it forces them to set aside their own interests.177 
Populists try to convince their supporters that opposition groups are working against national interests 
and, consequently, national security can only be achieved by putting pressure on these groups and 
even taking away their rights and freedoms.178 This is sometimes done by introducing state of 
emergency measures which allow states to derogate from certain human rights obligations. The use of 
emergency measures is strictly regulated under international human rights law so states must meet 
certain criteria before they can derogate from their human rights obligations.179 However, in practice, 
the depth and scope of emergency measures used by populist governments often appear problematic 
and unnecessarily lengthy with little regard for fundamental rights such as freedom of movement, 
privacy, equality and non-discrimination.180 In addition, populist governments appear to use these 
measures to silence their opposition rather than overcoming real threats to the life of the nation.181  
 
Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian rule in Turkey is a very clear illustration of this threat. Erdogan first 
came to power in Turkey in 2002 with a reformist and liberal agenda. He introduced several economic 
and social reforms in the country between 2002 and 2012 which increased his popularity amongst the 
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Turkish electorate.182 However, in 2013 a series of protests against Erdogan’s environmental policies, 
led to a change in his language; no longer was it reformist and liberal, it had turned into a nationalist 
and religious propaganda. Erdogan labelled these protestors as foreign spies and accused them of 
trying to destabilise the country when, in fact, they were Turkish citizens exercising their democratic 
right to free expression. He saw these protests as an opportunity to polarise the nation, strengthen his 
support base amongst conservative and religious voters and silence the opposition. Erdogan’s new 
religious and authoritarian tone saw a surge of critics from liberal and secular sections of Turkish 
society.183 However, instead of softening his tone, Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) used the coup attempt against the government in July 2016 as a justification to introduce 
emergency measures in the country and increase pressure on the opposition. These emergency 
measures soon turned into an opportunity to crackdown on his critics, the judiciary and the press. Critics 
were accused of plotting to take down the government and were painted as a threat to national security. 
The state of emergency lasted two years and saw around 2,745 judges and prosecutors being detained, 
many journalists being arrested and over 150,000 people comprising of academics, teachers, police 
officers, bureaucrats, doctors and various other civil servants being expelled from their public office 
without any administrative and judicial investigation and due process of law solely on the basis of 
allegations that they supported the organisation behind the coup attempt.184  
 
More importantly, Erdogan further used his influence to change the government system in the country. 
He convinced his supporters that the country would be stronger with a presidential system rather than 
a parliamentary democracy and managed to change the constitution with a referendum in April 2017. 
The constitutional amendment meant that power would be concentrated in the hands of the President 
giving him the right to dissolve the Parliament, appoint all members of his cabinet, elect all members of 
the Board of Judges and Prosecutors and other high state officials without the approval of the 
Parliament. This constitutional amendment is considered as the end of Turkish democracy by many 
scholars as it practically abolishes the system of checks and balances and the separation of powers 
which is necessary in a democratic society.185  
                                                 
182 Bican Sahin, ‘A Liberal Assessment of Turkish Democracy’ in Libertarian Club, Abusing the People: Global 
Challenges of Authoritarian Populism (Libek 2018) pp.8-10 
183 Ibid pp.10-12 
184 Ibid pp.12-13 
185 Ibid p.13 
 29 
 
This same threat now exists for other democracies who are currently experiencing a rise of populism. 
Although, populists accept popular sovereignty and the principle of majority, they are sceptical about 
the limitations liberal democracy imposes on governments because they claim that these limitations 
prevent the majority from achieving their will. This poses a threat to the guarantees that liberal 
democracy provides for opposition, minorities and marginal groups in society.186 Populist leaders are 
demonising political opposition, normalising hate and promoting division amongst society. The anti-
pluralist and divisive language used by populists can have detrimental effects on the gains democracy 
has made since the end of World War II.187 As a result, one must be cautious to not to be fooled by the 
democratic language used by populist leaders and remember the lessons learnt from the fascist era; 
an era where the same democratic rhetoric was merely a pretence and enabled the downfall of many 
democracies in Europe.188 
 
2.4. The populist threat to international human rights law 
 
International human rights law was developed in order to impose restrictions on what governments can 
do following the atrocities witnessed during World War II. Having seen what governments are capable 
of during the fascist era, states adopted a series of human rights treaties and created international 
human rights institutions to prevent future abuse.189 One of the main purposes of these institutions is to 
hold states accountable for the violations of international human rights obligations when domestic legal 
mechanisms fail to redress these violations.190 Getting states to uphold these human rights obligations 
has always been a struggle since the beginning of the international human rights movement after the 
end of WWII. However, in the past, most states showed a willingness to respect their human rights 
obligations even if they disregarded them in practice. Now, there is a new surge amongst populist 
leaders to openly attack human rights norms and institutions as they clash with their nationalist and 
xenophobic agenda.191 As a result, populists try to present international human rights obligations as an 
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obstacle to defending the nation from suspected threats. They portray human rights norms as only 
protecting terrorists, immigrants and asylum seekers with no regard for the safety and economic welfare 
of the ‘ordinary people’.192 They suggest if the majority wants to limit the rights of terrorists, immigrants, 
asylum seekers and minorities; international treaties and institutions should not stand in the way against 
this general will. Hence, populist governments are now increasingly undermining the authority of IHRL 
institutions. This trend is deteriorating the facilitating conditions that have long supported the work of 
IHRL institutions and posing a significant threat to the future of international human rights machinery.193  
 
Two factors have particularly facilitated the creation and expansion of IHRL institutions since the end 
of World War II. Firstly, wealthy and powerful states in Western Europe and North America pushed for 
codification of human rights norms and the creation of international monitoring bodies. These states 
have been advocating to make human rights a central pillar of the UN and regional organisations.194 
There was a widespread confidence in international human rights institutions as enough powerful states 
showed an interest to support this international framework.195 With the rise of populism, however, some 
of these states have been turning against these institutions using national security and sovereignty as 
their justification. Populist governments have been criticising international rulings and openly targeting 
human rights courts and review bodies. Although IHRL institutions experienced similar attacks in the 
past, they were pushed back by the US or European governments. The influence of right-wing populism 
in the USA and Europe is weakening the possibility of this pushback in the future hence leaving IHRL 
institutions vulnerable.196 Even more importantly, instead of being the facilitator for the effective work of 
international organisations, these powerful governments are now turning into a threat themselves. The 
US, for instance, alarmingly withdrew from the Human Rights Council in 2018 after calling it a “biased 
and hypocritical body which makes a mockery of human rights”.197 Trump also famously criticised the 
work of the UN for not always doing what the US wanted and threatened to cut the US funding for the 
work of the organisation.198 The US pays around 22% of the UN regular budget and 28% of the budget 
for peacekeeping operations. The country has also been the biggest voluntary contributor for the work 
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of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Blocking this financial support 
would have detrimental effects on the work that the organisation carries out for the promotion and 
protection of human rights worldwide.199 The US also plays a significant role in funding the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. The Commission has already been going through financial 
difficulties as they announced they may need to cut 40% of their staff in 2016. This outcome was 
avoided at the last-minute owing to extra funding. However, the withdrawal of US funding in the future 
could prepare the end of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and leaving human rights 
protection in the region at risk.200  
 
Similarly, European unity has been under attack by nationalist and anti-European populist leaders as 
they argue that the European Union (EU) undermines the sovereignty of domestic institutions.201 
Populist challengers have been trying to work their way into the European Parliament and aggravate 
Europe’s democratic dysfunction in order to promote anti-European sentiments amongst people. 
Europe’s inability to stop the migration flow from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
economic inequalities within the Eurozone further fuelled nationalist sentiments and antipathy towards 
European ideology.202 These failures facilitated populist efforts to mobilise support against the ideals 
and values that have long united European nations.203 In 2017, the UK became the first country to 
trigger the process to withdraw from the Union which raised concerns that other countries might follow 
suit.204 Furthermore, populists from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Poland have started a broad alliance under the name of ‘Europe of Nations and Freedom’ in order to 
promote nationalism on regional level.205 This trend highlights the risk of the return of a form of the 19th 
century nationalism which ultimately led to war and violence in Europe.206  
 
In addition, support for the Council of Europe (CoE) and its judicial body, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has been weakening amongst its members. Some states including Russia and Turkey 
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are already unresponsive to the judgments of the ECtHR.207 Many other states have been critical of the 
Court’s judgments for overturning the decisions of domestic courts and undermining state sovereignty. 
This led to the adoption of the Brighton Declaration in May 2012 to give European governments greater 
control and to remind ECtHR judges of their subsidiary role in the protection of human rights.208 In the 
UK, the feud between the British government and the ECtHR in the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. 
UK intensified the antipathy towards international human rights treaties and institutions. In this case, 
the decision of the UK domestic courts to deport radical Islamic cleric Abu Qatada back to Jordan was 
overturned by the ECtHR as it would violate Article 6 of the ECHR due to the risk of him being put on 
trial with the use of evidence obtained by torture by Jordanian prosecutors.209 The UK Home Secretary 
at that time, Theresa May, criticised the Court and branded this judgment as “crazy interpretation of 
human rights law”.210 This decision also angered sections of British society. Populists exploited these 
sentiments and a growing number of people started considering human rights as protecting terrorists 
and damaging the government’s efforts to defend the nation.211 A YouGov survey carried out in July 
2014 revealed that 41% of the respondents would support the UK’s withdrawal from the ECHR and the 
Council of Europe.212 The risk of withdrawal from the ECHR exists for all members of the Council of 
Europe who are experiencing the rise of national populism and poses a challenge to the future of the 
ECtHR. 
 
These parallel developments in the US and Europe pose a significant challenge for IHRL institutions as 
neither Europe nor the US would be able to cover for each other’s absence against attempts by populists 
to undermine the authority of international organisations.213 International human rights law already 
suffers from lacking effective enforcement mechanisms. The unwillingness of powerful European states 
and the USA to encourage other states to behave responsibly or in line with international human rights 
obligations would further damage the effectiveness of these enforcement mechanisms and lead states 
to depart from the established understanding of human rights norms by diluting their integrity and 
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interpretation.214  There is also a risk that under this current trend, populists may make their way into 
the heart of these organisations and change their structures and priorities. The OHCHR and the Human 
Rights Council can be vulnerable to this threat in the future. China and Russia have already expressed 
their desire to introduce major reforms to the Human Rights Council. If the rising number of populist 
governments side with Russia and China in the future, they can change the structure of these 
organisations and turn this threat into a reality.215 
 
A second facilitating factor for the advancement of human rights movement was the spirit of brotherhood 
and the climate of respect for human rights amongst people after the end of World War II. Today, 
however, there is an increasing antipathy towards human rights institutions and treaties amongst certain 
sections of Western society.216 This is partly because mainstream human rights advocacy has been 
prioritising civil and political rights, particularly the rights of marginalised and oppressed individuals and 
minorities. As a result, human rights advocacy often makes headlines with its work on immigrants, 
minorities and sometimes terrorists. Economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand, are 
addressed in a tokenistic manner and the issue of economic and social inequalities are often neglected. 
The majority in society are affected by these economic and social inequalities and so the lack of 
advocacy in this regard makes some people feel that they have no stake in the human rights 
framework.217 Populists use this as an opportunity to present human rights as only protecting minorities, 
immigrants and terrorists in opposition to the majority and, therefore, portray human rights as running 
contrary to national interests. Populists use national security as a justification for breaking the rules of 
international human rights law in order to ensure the continued support of the majority.218 Startlingly, an 
IPSOS survey in 2019 revealed that an increasing number of people now actually say they would back 
a leader who breaks the rules if it is in the best interest of the country.219  
 
Hence, populists now openly express their desire to push back against key pillars of international human 
rights law in order to protect so-called ‘national interests’.220 Trump’s election campaign, for instance, 
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reproduced various aspects of fascist anti-Semitism. Jews were the particular enemy of fascism. Whilst 
Trump’s strategy could not be accused of anti-Semitism, his rhetoric was directed against blacks, 
Latinos, Muslims and other non-white immigrants as he portrayed them as enemies of American 
values.221 He continued to use the language of hate during his presidency and disregarded basic human 
rights principles of dignity and equality. He attacked marginalised groups in society and threatened 
women’s reproductive rights and the rights of LGBT people.222 He stereotyped immigrants, demonised 
asylum seekers, vilified an American judge for having Mexican ancestry and told US congresswomen 
to go back to the country they came from allowing his supporters to chant “send her back”.223 Trump 
comes from a business background. He was not a neo-Nazi activist, he did not even take part in politics 
until 2015. He appealed to the psychology of the masses through his celebrity persona and his ‘man of 
the people’ attitude. However, his ability to manipulate the national sentiments of people and exploit 
their emotions in order to gain power pose the same threat that overturned the democracies in Europe 
during the fascist era.224  
 
Using language to scapegoat immigrants, minorities and marginalised groups is not unique to Trump. 
Many European populists exploited the fear of immigration by claiming that Europe and its Christian 
values were under attack by Muslims and promised to stop the perceived Islamisation of the 
Continent.225 Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orbán closed his country’s borders to Muslim refugees, 
the Dutch and French governments supported restrictions on the face veil for Muslim women and the 
Danish populists proposed a ban on the Muslim Holy Book, the Qur’an.226 Furthermore, Nigel Farage 
criticised race discrimination law in the UK for preventing employers from prioritising British people over 
immigrants and promised to axe much of the legislation as part of his political strategy.227 This trend 
normalises racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia within society as the language used by political 
leaders has the power to influence the thoughts and behaviour of individuals.228  
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In fact, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia have been on the rise in recent years in Europe and the 
USA owing to the rising trend of intolerant language used by populist politicians. In addition to 
supporting populists in elections, there are now increasing numbers of people who think it is acceptable 
to stereotype and attack foreigners and minorities.229 A recent survey conducted by the Guardian 
newspaper revealed that people with racist sentiments are now feeling increasingly emboldened to 
abuse or discriminate against people from ethnic minorities in the UK. 76% of the people from ethnic 
minorities who took part in the survey said that they have been abused by a stranger because of their 
ethnic identity.230 In addition, the 2018 crime figures from the Home Office revealed that racially 
motivated hate crimes in England and Wales almost doubled since 2015.231 The trend is very similar on 
the other side of the Atlantic. A survey conducted by Southern Poverty Law Centre in 2019 showed that 
the number of active hate groups in the US has hit 20 years high with almost 25% increase in the last 
four years alone.232 
 
The nationalist and xenophobic agenda promoted by populist leaders is an extremely worrying trend 
for disregarding the basic principles of human dignity upon which the United Nations (UN) and human 
rights movement were founded. Equality and non-discrimination are fundamental components of 
international human rights law and essential for the exercise and enjoyment of all other rights. Article 1 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that “all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Similarly, Art 1.3 of the UN Charter sets out “promoting respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion” as one of the purposes of the UN. Furthermore, Art 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art 2.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), Art 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Art 1.1 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) all prohibit discrimination on protected grounds such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
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status. Race discrimination is also considered as a peremptory norm of customary international law 
following the judgments of International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the AO Namibia233 and Barcelona 
Traction234 cases. As a result, states are expected to adhere to the prohibition on race discrimination 
regardless of whether they are a party to international and regional human rights instruments or not. 
 
Nonetheless, populist governments manipulate the language of democracy and justify their disregard 
for the basic principles of international human rights law on the grounds that they are serving the 
‘general will of the majority’ and protecting national security. They argue that they are democratically 
elected, and this gives them a mandate to deliver the will of the majority.235  Regardless of their poor 
human rights record, the nationalist and populist governments appear to attract increasing support in 
Europe and the USA. As a result, the growth of IHRL norms and institutions has been slowing down or 
in some instances even moving backwards. The inability of the UN Human Rights Council to appoint a 
special rapporteur on LGBT rights, the funding threats, the defiance of states against regional human 
rights courts rulings, the Brighton Declaration and the withdrawal of the USA from the Human Rights 
Council are some of the signs of weakening IHRL institutions.236 When viewed collectively, all of these 
developments reveal the vulnerability of international human rights treaties and institutions against the 
rise of populism. The extent of the populist threat is not yet fully known, and it is not obvious how bleak 
the future of human rights may be but regardless, this threat should not be underestimated. The 
international community must work together in order to find ways to safeguard international human 
rights institutions against populist threat before it is too late to act. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Confronting Right-Wing Populism with Militant Democracy Measures 
 
3.1. Justifying the application of militant democracy measures to right-wing populism 
 
3.1.1. Justification under the notion of ‘substantive democracy’ 
 
Right-wing extremism has been one of the main targets of militant democracy and has been a key factor 
in the development of the concept since the end of World War II. Although the concept has been widely 
used against traditional neo-Nazi parties, its application to the recent phenomenon of right-wing 
populism has been limited.237 This is partly because contemporary militant democracy measures appear 
to be directed against violent forms of right-wing extremism.238 Populists do not openly use violence, 
nor do they form paramilitary units to fight off the establishment. However, populist governments 
promote division and hatred and disregard the fundamental principles of liberal democracy such as 
equality and non-discrimination by spreading a racist and xenophobic message and alienating 
minorities and immigrants across Europe and the USA.239 This trend worries many scholars for 
awakening the memories of fascism.240 Populists reject such association and distance themselves from 
fascism.241 However, Italian historian Enzo Traverso argues that fascism no longer presents itself in the 
form of totalitarian dictators such as Hitler or Mussolini. It has transformed into a new form, where the 
language of democratic values and people power play a significant role in order to gain influence.242 
Populists do not march in the streets with troops behind them, instead they promise to give the power 
back to people and make democracy’s ideals work better for ordinary people.243 Nonetheless, the 
techniques they are using in order to mobilise support present alarming similarities to fascism. Fascists 
relied on nationalism and emotional manipulation in order to gain power.244 The same strategy is now 
being deployed by populists. The success of the populist movements in Europe and the USA has been 
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built on the exploitation of national sentiments amongst people.245 Hence, it is crucial that the scope of 
militant democracy is extended to right-wing populism in order to ensure that democracy and human 
rights are protected.  
 
Using militant democracy measures against non-violent forms of extremism has been criticised by 
supporters of ‘procedural democracy’. Dutch constitutional scholar Theo Bellekom supports the notion 
of procedural democracy and uses the metaphor of the ‘marketplace of ideas’. In his view, democracy 
is a free market where all ideas compete against each other and whichever idea prevails in the 
competition, should be respected.246 Similarly, Austrian legal scholar Hans Kelsen argues that in 
democracies, rather than viewpoint, the votes should matter. If democracy tries to resist the will of the 
majority, it will cease to be a democracy.247 Hence, supporters of procedural democracy do not favour 
constitutional defence of democracy as defending democracy should be a political will.248 However, this 
argument is dismissed by the supporters of the notion of ‘substantive democracy’. These scholars claim 
that democracy is more than just a procedure of vote counting.249 Plato claimed that democracy is not 
only about procedure, but also about substance which means that some fundamental principles and 
rules can not be changed even by a majority decision.250 Similarly, Dutch legal scholar George van den 
Bergh argues that the essence of democracy lies with the fundamental values of freedom, equality and 
the rule of law rather than the majority principle. Therefore, these principles must be respected by 
everyone.251 As there is no liberal utopia, there is always a risk that the essence of democracy can be 
undermined by anti-democrats who could exploit democratic procedures. Once they hold the power, 
anti-democrats can deny basic guarantees of democracy to opposition and minorities.252 American legal 
scholar Stephen Holmes argues that democracy has two options when faced with anti-democrats: 
repression or concession. Concession will legitimise anti-democratic motives and prepare the downfall 
of democracy. Repression, on the other hand, when used effectively and by lawful means will underline 
what is politically acceptable and determine the constitutional boundaries of tolerance.253 In light of this 
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argument, using militant democracy measures against right-wing populism can be justified as a 
legitimate defence against the anti-democratic motives of populists. 
 
3.1.2. Justification under international human rights law 
 
Militant democracy measures interfere with the exercise of various human rights principles which are 
guaranteed under international human rights treaties. These include freedom of opinion and expression, 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of association, the right to assembly and the right 
to vote and take part in the government. However, the concept of militant democracy does not 
contravene international human rights law. Instead, international human rights instruments support 
‘substantive democracy’ and militant democracy measures by authorising limitations to certain 
freedoms and prohibiting abuse of rights.254 The concerns and lessons learnt from the fascist era led 
drafters of international human rights treaties to include these measures in order to ensure that the 
rights guaranteed under these instruments are not exploited to destroy fundamental rights and 
democratic order.255 For instance, Article 29.2 of the UDHR gives way to right limitations by providing 
that “in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for rights and 
freedoms of others and of the meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society”. In addition, the ICCPR authorises restrictions to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Art 18), freedom of opinion and expression (Art 19), the right of peaceful 
assembly (Art 21), the right to freedom of association (Art 22) as long as the restrictions are “prescribed 
by law” and “necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security or public safety, public 
order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.256 
 
Furthermore, international human rights law also prohibits abuse of rights and advocacy of national, 
racial and religious hatred. Article 30 of the UDHR provides that “Nothing in this Declaration may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform 
any act aimed at destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein”. The same provision is 
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also repeated under Article 5.1 of the ICCPR. Human Rights Committee referred to this Article when it 
held that the reorganisation of fascist party was not protected under the ICCPR in the case of  M.A v. 
Italy.257 In addition, Article 20.2 of the ICCPR states that “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. 
Similarly, Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Form of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
permits declaring an organisation illegal if it promotes racial discrimination and prohibits public 
authorities or public institutions to incite racial discrimination.258 This provision can be extended to 
political parties that are promoting a racist political agenda which can justify their dissolution.259 
Although international human rights norms have various historical and geopolitical roots, right 
restrictions and abuse clauses can be included under the concept of militant democracy. Hence, all of 
the provisions identified above can be interpreted as the justification of militant democracy under 
international human rights law.260 
 
Militant democracy measures also have legal basis on a regional level. Although, the term ‘militant 
democracy’ is not officially used by regional institutions, the measures that come under the concept 
have been supported by regional organisations in the Americas and Europe.261 The American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) permits restrictions to freedom of conscience and religion (Art 
12), freedom of thought and expression (Art 13), the right to assembly (Art 15) and freedom of 
association (Art 16) providing that the restrictions are provided by law and necessary in a democratic 
society. Furthermore, Article 32 of the ACHR provides that “everyone has responsibilities to his family, 
his community, and mankind” and “the rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the 
security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society”.262 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights addressed the issue of “representative democracy and 
political rights” in its yearbook of 1990 and held that governments are required to “guarantee the 
organisation of all political parties, unless they are constituted to violate human rights”.263 With this 
statement, the Commission basically excluded political parties that aim to destruct human rights from 
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the Convention’s protection. In addition, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) and 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter both provide the notion of ‘undemocratic change of government’ 
which combats the abuse of democratic institutions in order to change the government system to 
autocracy in Americas. This notion is narrower than the concept of militant democracy as it only targets 
attempts to change the system by undemocratic means. However, it still contributes to the overall aim 
of protecting democracy.264 
 
In Europe, both the EU and CoE have measures in place in order to maintain respect for democracy 
and human rights. Both the EU and the CoE include respect for democracy and the rule of law as their 
membership requirement. Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union provides that “the Union is 
founded on the on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”.265 If a Member 
State breaches this provision, they can be subject to sanctions which may result in the suspension of 
their memberships rights. Similarly, Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe states that “Every 
member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by 
all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms…” and Article 8 of the 
Statute provides that the Committee of Ministers may decide that a member state ceases to be a 
member of the Council if it violates Article 3.266 This language can be interpreted as both the EU and 
the CoE indirectly holding member states responsible for providing defensive legal mechanisms in order 
to maintain democratic order.267  
 
Furthermore, Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU permits restrictions to certain 
rights as long as the restriction is provided by law and the essence of the right is respected. Article 54 
of the Charter prohibits abusing rights to prevent destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
recognised in the Charter. The EU also provides measures against racism and xenophobia with the 
adoption the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions 
of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law in 2008. The Preamble of the Framework Decision 
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reiterates that “racism and xenophobia are direct violations of the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles upon which the EU 
is founded and which are common to the Member States” and Article 1 of the document requires all 
Member States to take measures to punish publicly inciting violence or hatred on the basis of race, 
colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.268 
 
The ECHR also permits limitations to the right to respect for private and family life (Art 8), the freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion (Art 9), freedom of expression (Art 10) and freedom of assembly 
and association (Art 11) proving that they are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. 
Each article provides specific grounds for limitations to each right which include, amongst others, 
national security, public safety, the protection of public order, health and morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.269 In addition, the abuse clause is also included under the ECHR. Article 
17 of the ECHR provides that “Nothing in the Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein”. The Court highlighted the importance of this Article for the 
protection of democracy in the case of Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia. In its judgment, the 
Court held that “there is a very clear link between the Convention and democracy and no one may be 
authorised to rely on the Convention’s provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values 
of a democratic society”.270   
 
In its earlier judgments, the Court mostly used this abuse clause in order to justify the measures that 
come under the concept of militant democracy.271 The first party dissolution case the Court handled 
was the Communist Party of Germany v. the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957. In this case, the 
European Commission on Human Rights examined the lawfulness of the decision of the Federal 
Constitution Court of Germany to ban Communist Party of Germany (KPD). The Commission referred 
to Article 17 of the ECHR and upheld the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the basis that 
Communist Party advocated a regime “incompatible with the Convention, inasmuch as it includes the 
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destruction of many of the rights or freedoms enshrined therein”.272 Similarly, in the case of 
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, the Commission referred to Article 17 of the 
Convention as a justification to restrict the rights of those whose activities aimed at destruction of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. In this case, the president and the vice-president of the 
Netherlands’ Volks Unie party claimed that their right to take part in elections were violated as their 
party was banned and the candidate list was declared invalid by the Dutch authorities. However, the 
Commission held that the applicants could not claim that their right to take part in elections were violated 
as they intended to use this right for a purpose deemed unacceptable under Article 17 of the 
Convention.273  
 
The case of Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey was the first case where the Court supported restricting 
freedom of association by banning political parties and it strengthened the international legality of 
militant democracy measures.274 In this case, the Court held that political parties are a form of 
association and they are essential for effective functioning of democracy, hence their dissolution would 
interfere with Article 11 of the Convention and this interference can only be permitted if there are 
“convincing and compelling reasons”.275 The Court underlined that “a political party whose leaders incite 
to violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy or which is aimed at the destruction 
of democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay claim 
to the Convention’s protection against penalties imposed on those grounds”.276 Thus, the Court decided 
that Turkey did not violate the freedom of association by banning Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) as 
the Party promoted the concept of jihad and aimed to replace the existing secular order with Islamic law 
(sharia). The Court argued that Turkey was authorised to act in a militant manner in order to stop the 
threat that Refah Partisi and its religious agenda posed to democracy and the constitutional principle of 
secularism. Furthermore, the Court held that Islamic law “clearly diverges from Convention values, 
particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women 
and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts. 
In the Court’s view, a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a State 
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party to the Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal 
that underlines the whole of the Convention.”277 Hence, the Court found no violation of Article 11 as the 
restrictions to freedom of association was necessary in a democratic society in this case.278  
 
All of the international human rights provisions and the Court judgments identified above emphasise 
the importance of democratic order as they only permit restrictions to rights if it is “necessary in a 
democratic society”. This language indicates that international human rights law favours ‘substantive 
democracy’ and states owe it to the international community to maintain democratic government and 
they shall be able to restrict certain rights in the pursuit of this goal.279 When viewed collectively, these 
provision and judgments indicate that militant democracy measures have now acquired a legal basis at 
the international level.280 As a result, the measures provided under international human rights law can 
also be applicable to activities of right-wing populists if their conduct can be interpreted as a threat to 
democratic order. 
 
3.2. Challenges to the application of militant democracy measures  
 
Many scholars now agree that the rise of right-wing populism poses a threat to democracy and human 
rights and this legitimises the application of national and international militant democracy provisions to 
populist extremists.281 However, in practice, applying militant democracy measures to populist parties 
proves challenging. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is not one coherent theory of 
militant democracy and no clear criteria for the scope of its application.282 Although, national and 
international human rights instruments give legal basis to militant democracy measures, they provide 
less guidance on what would constitute a threat to democracy. The meaning and scope of these 
provisions require judicial interpretation.283 Skilled populist politicians can navigate their way around 
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these provisions and avoid prosecution by hiding behind the protection of freedom of speech.284 These 
politicians often argue that “they are saying out loud what people are quietly thinking” as it was once 
claimed by the National Front leader Marine Le Pen.285 This claim can make it harder for national courts 
to prove the anti-democratic motives of these politicians even though they subtly undermine the values 
of liberal democracy by attacking opposition, minorities and immigrants.286 On the other hand, the 
vagueness of what constitutes a threat to democracy also leaves the concept open to abuse by states 
in the name of democratic self-preservation. This could make the concept counterproductive and lead 
to violation of fundamental human rights principles.287  
 
Svetlana Tyulkina who studied the legal theory of militant democracy supports leaving the meaning and 
scope of militant democracy open to judicial interpretation. She argues that constructing a concrete 
definition of militant democracy would actually limit the effectiveness of the concept.288 This is because 
each country has its own peculiarities and threats to democracy evolve continuously. Tyulkina argues 
that states should be able to provide various justifications and reasons for introducing militant 
democracy measures, however these measures should be subject to caveats and reservations and 
their application should be justified with ‘convincing and compelling’ reasons under the supervision of 
IHRL institutions.289 She recommends a reliable and independent judicial review process as the answer 
to effective and cautious interpretation of the concept.290 The ECtHR also emphasises the importance 
of providing ‘convincing and compelling’ reasons in party ban cases. The Court found several European 
states guilty of violating freedom of association for not satisfying the Court to hold that dissolved parties 
posed a threat to democracy.291 These judgments have the potential to deter states from abusing 
militant democracy measures and can be helpful in establishing a more coherent theory of the concept 
of militant democracy.  
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Tyulkina also suggests that the application of militant democracy should be extended to the technique 
of emotional manipulation. In her view, emotional manipulation can be attributed to all threats to 
democracy; be it fascists, religious fundamentalists or terrorists.292 This technique is used to exploit 
people’s emotions in order to change the course of rational democratic decision-making process and 
can be fatal for democracy.293 This technique is now being used by populists in order to mobilise support 
by exploiting the national sentiments of people. Addressing the economic and social conditions that 
leave voters vulnerable to emotional manipulation can be helpful in preventing any further rise of right-
wing populism.294 However, as Lowenstein argued, if democracy remains too tolerant, anti-democrats 
can always find reasons for emotional manipulation for political gains, be it economic inequalities, 
religion, immigration, class difference or terrorism.295 Therefore, having legal defence mechanisms in 
place and ensuring effective, independent and timely judicial intervention would be the best way forward 
in order to underline what is politically acceptable, determine the constitutional boundaries of tolerance 
and protect the future of democracy and human rights.296 Hence, both national and international law 
should be clearer on their stance on emotional manipulation and set boundaries to subvert such 
activities.297 
 
Another obstacle in the way of confronting right-wing populism with militant democracy measures is the 
problem of identifying the right moment for judicial intervention. If the intervention is too early, it can be 
portrayed as being a political, disproportionate and undemocratic decision. If the intervention is too late 
and the party has gained in popularity, on the other hand, the effectiveness of militant democracy 
measures would be severely hampered.298 A coherent militant democracy should address the issue of 
timing. Democratic responsibility calls for finding the right balance between moderate and cautious use 
of militant democracy measures and ensuring that the future of democracy is not undermined.299 In 
2009, the ECtHR shed some light on the issue of timing in the case of Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. 
Spain. The case concerned the decision of Spain’s Supreme Court to ban political parties Herri 
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Batasuna and Batasuna for supporting terrorist organisation ETA. In its judgment, the ECtHR firstly 
reiterated the importance of pluralism and freedom of expression in democracy.300 However, the Court 
ruled that if a political party promotes a change in the law or the legal and constitutional structures of 
the State which is incompatible with fundamental democratic principles, restrictions to freedom of 
expression and association can be justified.301 The Court argued that States “cannot be required to wait, 
before intervening, until a political party has seized power and begun to take concrete steps to 
implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the Convention and democracy…The Court 
accepts that where the presence of such a danger has been established by national courts, after 
detailed scrutiny subjected to rigorous European supervision, a State may reasonably forestall 
execution of such a policy which is incompatible with the Convention’s provisions that might prejudice 
civil peace and the country’s democratic regime.”302 The Court ruled that the actions of these parties 
indicated ‘explicit support’ for violence and terror which goes against ‘organised existence of a 
democratic state’. Hence, the Court found no violation of Article 10 and 11 of the Convention and upheld 
Spain’s decision to ban these parties.303 Although, the ECtHR has provided some guidance on this 
issue, identifying the right time for intervention remains a difficult task for the national courts as the 
decision will almost always be considered a political one.304 
 
Interpreting what constitutes a threat to democracy and identifying the right moment for judicial 
intervention appear to be the two major challenges to the application of militant democracy measures. 
Ultimately, states have the main responsibility to overcome these challenges and confront right-wing 
populism and maintain democratic order within their borders. However, international law can also 
provide an extra layer of protection by establishing a more coherent theory of militant democracy and 
holding states responsible to implement effective militant democracy measures and have independent 
judicial review processes in place at a domestic level.305 International organisations can establish 
common standards for militant democracy measures in order to maintain respect for democracy and 
human rights, but also to prevent the misuse of the concept of militant democracy. The ECtHR already 
provides some guidance on the application of militant democracy measures. It affords states with limited 
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‘margin of appreciation’ in determining what constitutes a threat to democracy and identifying the right 
moment for intervention. However, this interpretation goes hand in hand with the supervision of the 
ECtHR to ensure that right restrictions and party bans are justified with ‘convincing and compelling’ 
reasons.306 Furthermore, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe adopted Guidelines on 
prohibition and dissolution of political parties in January 2000 to establish common principles on party 
bans amongst member states.307 States can benefit from having further guidance from regional and 
international organisations on how to confront right-wing populism and subvert the technique of 
emotional manipulation.  
 
Today, protecting liberal values of democracy and fundamental human rights has become one of the 
main characteristics of international law. IHRL has developed as a whole new branch of international 
law and has been promoting respect for human rights and democracy around the world.308 As a result, 
confronting right-wing populism is no longer only a matter for individual states, but is also a concern at 
an international level. The rise of right-wing populism around the world weakens the support for IHRL 
institutions and threatens their future. This is because, states are the main actors in the creation and 
development of international law. If increasing number of states end up with populist governments, the 
priorities of international law could change as well, resulting in weakening international support for 
democracy and human rights.309 Confronting right-wing populism would ensure that states refrain from 
undermining IHRL institutions and instead co-operate with them in the promotion of liberal values and 
fundamental human rights. As a result, international law would also benefit from holding states 
responsible for having effective militant democracy measures in place. 310  
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CONCLUSION  
 
The concept of militant democracy could be seen as somewhat paradoxical insofar as it uses the 
restriction of democratic freedoms and human rights of those who are opposed to those very freedoms 
and rights.  Indeed, the concept reflects the views put forward by Karl Popper that for a liberal 
democracy to function well and promote human rights it must “claim, in the name of tolerance, the right 
not to tolerate the intolerant”.311  In today’s fractious, divided world the concept of militant democracy is 
more important than ever as it provides a safeguard for the future of democracy and human rights 
against potential threats. This paper has demonstrated that right-wing populism has emerged as the 
single greatest threat to liberal democracy and human rights in the last two decades. Although, right-
wing populists pretend to be on the side of democracy by defending popular sovereignty and the 
principle of majority, they are sceptical about the limitations that liberal democracy imposes on 
governments because they claim that these limitations prevent the majority from achieving their will.312 
This paper has shown that support for right-wing populism has been steadily on the rise in Europe and 
the USA as populists continue to exploit national sentiments amongst people with the politics of 
emotional manipulation. This trend reached new heights with Trump’s presidency in the USA and the 
victory for the Brexit campaign in the UK and this has brought a new sense of urgency for exploring 
ways to confront the rise of right-wing populism. Populists are now openly attacking liberal values and 
undermining human rights through the politics of hate, a promotion of division, fear and scapegoating. 
This trend worries many scholars for threatening the future of liberal democracy and, in turn, the future 
of international human rights law given that respect for liberal values has long facilitated the work of 
IHRL institutions.313  
 
This paper proposes the use of militant democracy measures as a potential tool for confronting right-
wing populism, hence protecting the future of international human rights law. It has been demonstrated 
that applying militant democracy measures to right-wing populism can be justified under the notion of 
‘substantive democracy’ and international human rights law. However, the lack of a coherent legal 
theory on the concept of militant democracy makes determining what constitutes a threat to democracy 
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and identifying the right moment for judicial interpretation a challenging task and leaves the concept 
open to abuse.314 Despite these shortcomings, the lack of realistic alternatives and the significance of 
the values at stake makes militant democracy an important tool as it can highlight the constitutional 
boundaries of democratic tolerance and act as a deterrent for the enemies of democracy and human 
rights.  
 
In order to address the shortcomings of militant democracy, this paper proposes that militant democracy 
measures should be subject to caveats and reservations and their application should be justified with 
‘convincing and compelling’ reasons under the supervision of IHRL institutions. International law can 
provide an extra layer of security by establishing common standards for militant democracy measures 
in order to promote respect for democracy and human rights, but also to prevent the misuse of the 
concept of militant democracy.315 Democratic responsibility calls for finding the right balance between 
moderate and cautious use of militant democracy measures and ensuring that the future of democracy 
and human rights is not undermined. This paper also recommends that the application of militant 
democracy measures should be extended to the politics of emotional manipulation as this technique is 
being used by populists and other extremists to gain popularity by exploiting people’s fear and altering 
the course of rational decision-making process. Confronting right-wing populism would ensure that 
states refrain from undermining IHRL institutions and instead co-operate with them in the promotion of 
liberal values and fundamental human rights. Therefore, states owe it to the international community to 
ensure that democracy and human rights are safeguarded for future generations. One must be cautious 
to not to be fooled by the democratic language used by populist leaders and recall the lessons learnt 
from the fascist era; an era where the same democratic rhetoric prepared the downfall of many 
democracies in Europe. The threat comes once again from within the democratic world and this time it 
must not be underestimated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
314 Tyulkina (2015) supra n.1 p.211 
315 Ellian and Rijpkema (2018) supra n.76 pp.79-94 
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